Does import competition alter the extent to which employers, after negotiating workers' wages upon hire, subsequently shield those wages from external labor-market conditions? If increased competition induces a switch away from these wage implicit agreements, then (1) the sensitivity of workers' wages to the current unemployment rate should increase as competition increases and (2) the sensitivity of workers' wages to the unemployment rate prevailing upon hire should decrease. Using exchange-rate movements to generate exogenous variation in import competition, I find evidence supporting both of these predictions. I show that increased financial pressures on employers is one mechanism driving these effects.
I. Introduction
Complete employment contracts are expensive to design and enforce. As a result, employers and workers often let their relationship be governed by informal agreements. They share an unwritten understanding about pay, hours, work quality, working conditions, job security, and other dimensions of employment.
1 To use Okun's (1981) characterization, the market for labor is governed by an invisible handshake rather than cleared by an invisible hand. According to the popular press, however, the past decade has witnessed a substantial transformation of the employment relationship in the United States. Multiple episodes of downsizing and an increased reliance on temporary workers are commonly cited as evidence of a decline of those informal arrangements between employers and workers. In particular, it has been argued that increased competitive and financial pressures in U.S. product markets, such as those induced by trade openness, have turned the employment relationship into more of a spotmarket transaction. In this article, I develop an empirical framework to investigate this claim more systematically. 2 The unwritten understanding between employers and workers covers many dimensions. In this research, I concentrate on implicit arrangements in the wage-setting process. Under the arrangements I consider, wages are negotiated when workers enter into a firm and are thereafter shielded from the external labor market. I focus on such "shielding agreements," or "cohort effects," in the wage-setting process for three main reasons. First, they are theoretically relevant. Under fairly general conditions, such agreements optimally emerge as a way for risk-neutral firms to insure risk-averse workers against cyclical fluctuations. The resulting risk-sharing wages are sensitive to the external labor-market conditions at the time that the worker is hired (and the agreement negotiated) but do not respond to the current state of the labor market. Second, previous ethnographic and case studies have validated the relevance of these wage-setting arrangements. For instance, Doeringer and Piore (1971) describe how contacts between internal and external labor markets in large manufacturing establishments are lim-1 Union contracts are an exception. They are written and can be enforced in a court of law. However, they probably do not cover all possible contingencies and are, in that sense, incomplete. In this article, I distinguish between union and nonunion workers.
2 This research project complements a growing literature that aims to assess directly evidence of a decline in internal labor markets. Researchers have previously looked at trends in labor-market outcomes such as job tenure (Swinnerton and Wial 1995; Diebold, Neumark, and Polsky 1997; Farber 1997a Farber , 1997b , earnings instability (Gottschalk and Moffitt 1994) , and wage dispersion between and within firms (Groshen and Levine 1998) . Rather than looking solely at trends in labor-market outcomes, I study the causal link between such labor-market outcomes and changes that independently occurred in other markets.
ited to a subset of jobs, or "ports of entry." Insiders' wages are determined by a set of administrative rules and customs that are typically only weakly influenced by changes in the external labor market. Similarly, one of the main findings of Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom's (1994a, 1994b) case study of 20 years of personnel data is the presence of cohort effects in wages. Once workers are inside the firm, their wages seem to follow a common pattern that is very different from the pattern of wages for new entrants; much of the wage differences across cohorts come from variation in the starting wages. The third main reason for studying these wage-setting arrangements, besides their theoretical and practical relevance, is that they can easily be examined empirically. I will regard a low elasticity of current wages to the current local labor-market unemployment rate and a high elasticity of current wages to the unemployment rate at the time of job start as two "symptoms" of the use of shielding agreements in the employment relationship. I will ask whether and how increased competitive pressures in the product market affect both of these wage-unemployment elasticities. 3 Empirically, competitive pressures in the product market can be correlated with wage-setting practices without having a causal effect. First, adverse labor cost shocks or changes in wage-setting practices can themselves directly affect the competitive position of a firm or industry. For example, employers who decide to buffer their workers' wages from the vagaries of the external market may face relatively higher costs during economic downturns, which may weaken their competitive position at those times. Also, managers with weak incentives may be more likely both to protect their workers and also to be targeted by competitors. These examples justify the need to identify a source of variation in product market competition that is independent of adverse changes in labor costs or other firm wage-setting practices. To that purpose, I focus on foreign competition as one form of product market competition. I use source-3 It is worth stating at this point why my focus is not on the impact of product market competition on wage levels or on job stability and tenure length. Let us consider wage levels first. One might argue that a reduction of wages following an increase in import penetration is evidence of a change in the wage-setting institutions that give workers above-market wages. However, a change in wage levels can also be interpreted under constant wage-setting rules. For example, import penetration reduces the product demand faced by domestic firms and shifts down the demand for labor. If the wage-setting curve is not perfectly elastic, the shift down of the labor demand curve will reduce wages. Hence, import penetration can reduce wages without any change in wage setting. A similar argument justifies why I do not look at job stability and tenure length as dependent variables either. Any evidence that job stability and tenure length decline with competition (see Kletzer 1998) , while consistent with a decline in implicit contracts, could also result only from a negative labor demand shock. weighted exchange rate movements to generate exogenous variation in the level of import penetration by industry.
Using merged labor, trade, and corporate data from the period 1976-92, I find evidence consistent with a weakening of informal wage shielding agreements in more competitive environments. I show that an increase in import penetration increases the elasticity of workers' current wages to the current local unemployment rate. I also show that an increase in import penetration reduces the elasticity of current wages to the unemployment rate that was prevailing at the time of job start. I verify the robustness of these results to various specification assumptions and sample selection rules.
I then study a specific mechanism by which import penetration may weaken the use of wage-shielding agreements. Wage-shielding agreements require that firms can commit to insure their workers even at times where they could lower their labor cost by paying a spot-market wage. A standard way to achieve such commitment is through reputational concerns. Firms will not opportunistically renege on implicit contractual agreements with their workers because they may suffer higher labor costs in the future if they do so. I suggest that firms' ability to commit to implicit wageshielding contracts decreases in more competitive environments. An increase in import penetration reduces firms' earnings and increases the risk of financial distress. An increased risk of financial distress shortens corporate horizons and therefore weakens reputational concerns: the future cost of opportunistically reneging on implicit agreements goes down when firms face shorter horizons. To test for the relevance of this mechanism, I introduce measures of corporate performance and capital structure as potential explanatory variables. I first show that declines in industry corporate returns induced by exchange rate movements increase the sensitivity of wages to the current unemployment rate. Second, I use industry leverage as a proxy for financial distress. I show that increases in import penetration reduce the sheltering of workers' wages more in highly leveraged industries. 4 The rest of the article is organized as follows: in Section II, I describe in a simple illustrative model the financial distress channel by which import penetration can alter the use of wage-shielding agreements. In Section III, I present the empirical methodology and discuss the identification strategy. Section IV reviews the different data sources. I present and in- 4 The leverage and corporate returns results could also be reconciled with more behavioral models. First, workers may consider it "fair" for firms that are experiencing financial pressure to pay the spot-market wages (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986) . Second, managers may have a "preference" for honoring wagesetting arrangements but see their discretion to do so reduced with higher levels of competition in the product market (Shleifer and Summers 1988) . I discuss these alternative models in Sec. V.E.
terpret the results in Section V. I first study the causal link between import penetration and the sheltering of workers' wages (Sec. V.B). I then investigate the mediating role of corporate attributes such as financial leverage and corporate earnings (Secs. V.C-V.E). Section VI summarizes and offers concluding remarks.
II. An Illustrative Model
In Section II, I outline in a simple partial equilibrium model one mechanism by which competitive pressures in general, and import competition in particular, can change the employment relationship. The model shows how greater import penetration, by reducing corporate earnings and increasing the risk of financial distress, weakens the use of implicit wageshielding agreements. The goal of the model is twofold. First, while merely illustrative, the model should clarify and coordinate thoughts about various theoretical issues. Second, and most important, the model provides a basic framework for the empirical analysis that follows.
A. Setup
Consider a firm having access to a technology that requires one worker. Labor is the only input used in production. The firm is risk-neutral and has an infinite horizon. Firm's profit in period t is defined as ,
where is revenue and is the wage paid to the worker. The firm's R w t t objective at time t is to maximize the net present value of expected future profits. Workers are risk-averse and live for one period. 5 Workers' utility in period t is , with and . Workers' reservation wage is
subject to random productivity shocks and follows an AR(1) process: , where is the long-run equilibrium labor pror p (1 Ϫ r)r* ϩ rr ϩ h r* t t Ϫ1 t ductivity, , and is equal to with probability .5 and to 0 ! r ! 1 h h1 0 t with probability .5.
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When modeling the determination of the wage in the firm, I assume w t that explicit wage contracts between the firm and the worker cannot be implemented. Instead, the firm and the worker can adopt one of two polar wage-setting rules. First, the firm can pay the worker a spot-market wage that makes the worker indifferent between working at the firm and increases the spot-market wage .
6 s w t Alternatively, the firm and the worker may "sign" an implicit wage contract. The firm may offer a contractual wage that protects the c w t worker against random shocks to . More specifically, at the time of hire r t and before the shock to the reservation wage is realized, the firm and h t the worker can voluntarily agree to shift all labor-market risks to the riskneutral firm.
7 Workers' expected utility under the contractual wage will be pushed down to their expected utility under spot-market wage:
. The optimal contract in this case consists in
paying the risk-averse worker a constant wage that is independent of c w t the realization of . Such a wage is implicitly given by
Note that while is independent of the realization of , it does depend c w r t t on the reservation wage at the time that the implicit contract is "signed," . Such a contractual wage matches closely the "cohort effects" doc- umented by Baker et al. (1994a Baker et al. ( , 1994b as well as the idea of "ports of entry" discussed in Doeringer and Piore (1971) . I assume that workers face mobility costs that make them unwilling to switch jobs after having contracted with a firm. 8 Firms, by contrast, may have an incentive to renege on the contractual wage whenever . I assume that the contractual wage is enforced through reputational c w t concerns. More specifically, I assume that if the firm reneges on , it c w t loses reputation with future generations of workers and has to pay the spot-market wage forever after.
9 s w t 6 The results directly generalize to a case where the worker has strictly positive bargaining power, and the firm and the worker Nash-bargain over the spot-market wage (Bertrand 1998) . s w t 7 Alternatively, I could allow for a continuum of partial insurance contracts and study how import competition affects the optimal level of insurance. For simplicity, I choose to consider only the polar opposite cases of no insurance or full insurance.
8 See Harris and Holmstrom (1982) and Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) for models where workers are costlessly mobile between firms. I do test a version of the model in which workers are not perfectly immobile and report these results in n. 35. The main conclusion of the article is unaffected under this alternative model. 9 The importance of the reputation mechanism in the enforcement of implicit contracts is a well-known point. So is its application to the employment relationship. Akerlof (1980 Akerlof ( , 1982 suggests that firms invest in their long-term reputation to generate productive high morale among employees. Espinoza and Rhee (1989) develop a repeated game version of the monopoly union bargaining model. They show that if unions and firms have enough to gain from future interactions, cooperation is possible, and the dynamic version of the monopoly union model need not be as inefficient as the static version. Other well-known applications include Bull (1987) and Kreps (1990) .
The firm is also exposed to revenue shocks every period. Corporate revenue can be either low ( ), with probability n, or high ( ), with R R R t L H probability . One could interpret a higher value of n as an increase (1 Ϫ n) in import penetration in the firm's industry or as an appreciation of the dollar. More generally, a higher value of n will proxy for an increase in competitive pressures in the firm's industry.
I assume that shocks to revenue and shocks to the reservation wage are independent. I also assume, in this partial equilibrium setup, that r t changes in n do not affect the reservation wage . These assumptions are r t valid if the firm is small compared with the relevant external labor market. Clearly, if the firm is not small, a general equilibrium analysis that endogenizes the reservation wage would be more appropriate. Such a r t general equilibrium analysis would be especially warranted when trying to derive the aggregate effect of globalization on wage-setting practices. Instead, our goal in this theory section and the empirical sections that follow is to analyze how, other things equal, a firm (or industry) that experiences an increase in import penetration may change its wage-setting practices.
Finally, because I want to highlight the role of financial distress factors, I consider the case where the firm has an outstanding debt D in each period, resulting from a previous investment. I assume that investors will liquidate the firm if an amount D is not repaid at the end of each period t.
10 To make the problem interesting, I assume that the parameters of the model are such that the debt D cannot be repaid whenever :
The timing of every period t of the game is as follows: (1) a worker is hired by the firm and an implicit wage contract is or is not signed. (2) The reservation wage is realized. (3) The firm pays the worker: if an r t implicit wage contract is "signed" in step 1, the firm either pays or c w t reneges on the contract and pays ; otherwise, the firm pays . (4) 10 Such a risk of default derives naturally from an optimal debt contract under incomplete contract models. If managers can costlessly divert the firm's cash flow because the cash flow is not verifiable, investors must threaten to liquidate the firm in order to get repaid. See Hart and Moore (1989) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) for a general theoretical treatment. Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) present an application of this theory to explain movements in markups over the business cycle.
11 The positive economic profits could result, e.g., from the presence of barriers to entry in the firm's industry. Alternatively, one could assume that the firm's ability to repay the debt also depends on whether the firm is paying the spotmarket wage or the contractual wage. An interesting implication of such an extension is that an increase in n may in that case also increase the firm's ex ante preference for wage flexibility (Bertrand 1998 ( (
If a reneging firm is "punished" by having to pay a spot-market wage forever after, the cost of reneging in period t is given by
The contractual wage will be a self-enforcing equilibrium as long c w t as the cost of reneging equation (5) is larger than the gain from reneging equation (4). In other words, will be self-enforcing as long as
As expression (6) clearly indicates, a self-enforcing equilibrium in c w t becomes less and less likely as n increases. As n increases, the firm discounts the future at a higher rate and becomes less able credibly to commit to pay the contractual wage . As n increases, workers become less willing c w t to accept implicit wage-setting agreements that are not credible. In other words, as n increases, wage setting moves away from and toward . Note that, under the assumptions of the model, an increase in n does not affect the enforceability of in the absence of a risk of default. c w t Indeed, if the firm does not face a strictly positive probability of liquidation, for example when , the gain from reneging in period t is
while the cost to reneging in period t is given by
In the absence of a risk of financial distress, neither the gain from nor the cost of reneging on implicit wage-setting contracts depends on n.
C. Implications for Empirical Work
In the empirical work that follows, I propose to test the major implications of the model. In practice, I will use the state unemployment rate at time t as a proxy for the reservation wage , a higher unemployment r t rate implying a lower reservation wage. I will use the state unemployment rate at the time of job start as a proxy for the reservation wage . I will r tϪ1 use industry-level measures of import penetration as a proxy for n, a higher level of import penetration implying that each firm in the industry is more likely to experience a negative revenue shock.
Equations (1) and (2) directly motivate how I empirically distinguish spot-market wage setting ( ) from contractual wage setting ( ). I will s c w w t t interpret a more negative correlation between current wages and current unemployment and less negative correlation between current wages and unemployment at the time of job start as evidence of a switch away from and toward . Equations (1) and (2), in combination with equation (6), motivate the tests I perform to study the impact of import penetration on the wagesetting process: (i) as import penetration increases, I expect the sensitivity of current wages to the current local labor-market unemployment rate to increase; (ii) as import penetration increases, I expect the sensitivity of current wages to the unemployment rate at the time of job start to decrease; and (iii) I expect both of these effects to be stronger in more-12 However, even with perfect capital markets, an increase in n could affect the firm's discount rate by increasing the probability of exiting the industry because of negative economic profits. We have ruled out that case here by assuming that . See Bertrand (1998) for an extension of the model to
the perfect capital market case.
leveraged firms. I now describe in detail the empirical methodology I follow to test each of these three predictions.
III. Empirical Strategy
Using repeated cross-sections of individual-level data, I first test prediction i by estimating the following equation: w ijkt Equation (9) is a slight modification of the standard wage curve (see Blanchflower and Oswald 1994; Card 1995; Blanchard and Katz 1997) where the negative relationship between current wage ( ) and current w ijkt unemployment rate ( ) is allowed to depend on the level of import u kt penetration.
14 The coefficient of interest in equation (9) is c. Under the model described above, I expect c to be negative. A negative value for c implies that a higher level of import penetration increases (in absolute value) the current wage-current unemployment elasticity.
There are two points worth highlighting about the specification in equation (9). First, I rely on industry-level variation in import penetration. This may raise some concerns because of the difficulty of comparing competition levels between industries. The addition of industry fixed effects partly alleviates these concerns. Industry fixed effects allow me to f j look at within-industry variation in and .
Second, I use individual-level data even though the source of variation I exploit operates only at the industry-state-year level. The main advantage of a microdata set is to mitigate the importance of potential composition biases. Suppose that a demographic reshuffling of the workforce accom- 13 In practice, I will define as the current level of import penetration in imp jt an industry but also as an average of current and future import penetration levels in order to capture more permanent changes in import penetration, as implied by eq. (6). See Sec. V.B for details.
14 Appendix A discusses in further detail identifying assumptions for this econometric model. 15 Obviously, concerns could still arise if there is between-industry variation in the wage-unemployment elasticity. I have considered alternative specifications of eq. (9), where I allowed for interactions of industry and also year fixed effects with . The results were qualitatively unaffected.
u kt panies changes in the competitive environment and that the elasticity of wages to the unemployment rate differs across demographic groups. One might then worry that the estimated coefficient on reflects in imp # u jt kt part some of these compositional changes in the industry workforce. The vector of individual characteristics captures observable changes in the D ijkt demographic mix of an industry.
One major limitation of the cross-sectional data is that they do not provide information on work history.
16 I cannot test in the cross-sectional data whether import penetration also affects the elasticity of the current wage to the unemployment rate at the time of job start (prediction ii of the model). I therefore also use individual-level panel data to estimate the following equation:
where is the state unemployment rate that was prevailing in the year us ikt that individual i started working for her present (period t) employer and is a vector of individual fixed effects. The coefficients of interest in g i equation (10) are c and k. Under the model described above, I expect c to be negative and k to be positive. A negative value for c means that a higher level of import penetration increases the current wage-current unemployment elasticity. A positive value for k means that a higher level of import penetration decreases the current wage-starting unemployment elasticity.
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Another advantage of using panel data, besides the availability of a work history, is that it also allows me to control for individual fixed 16 I use the Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (MORGs) of the Current Population Survey (CPS) to construct the cross-sectional sample. Advantages of the CPS data are a long time period and a large representative sample. The MORGs, however, do not contain information about work history. The mobility supplements to various January CPSs do contain information on how long workers have held their current jobs. However, these supplements are not available on a frequent basis. Only six mobility supplements are available between 1973 and 1991. 17 If the true model is as described in Sec. II, one might be concerned about possible biases in eq. (9), which includes neither the starting unemployment rate nor the starting unemployment rate interacted with import penetration. More specifically, the estimates of coefficients a and c in eq. (9) will be biased if the current unemployment rate and the starting unemployment rate are correlated. I used the panel data to assess the sign and magnitude of this correlation. Controlling for state, year, and industry effects, I found a positive but statistically insignificant correlation between current and starting unemployment rate. This implies that, if anything, the estimate of a will be biased downward and the estimate of c will be biased upward, assuming that the true model is as described in Sec. II. The results in Sec. V confirm this conjecture.
effects . Such individual effects eliminate compositional problems caused g i by unobserved characteristics that are constant over time. The presence of individual fixed effects also lessens concerns of biases arising if individuals who start a new job in a recession differ along observable and unobservable dimensions.
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Building on equations (9) and (10), one can easily test prediction iii by comparing the estimated values of c and k in high-and low-leverage industries. The model described above predicts that c and k should be larger in absolute value in more-leveraged industries.
One could, in principle, directly estimate equations (9) and (10) using ordinary least squares (OLS). However, one might suspect that import penetration measures are correlated with some component of the error term w, in which case OLS will yield biased and inconsistent estimates of the parameters of the model. First, reverse causation can contaminate the OLS estimation as adverse shocks to labor costs or changes in personnel practices may directly affect the competitive position of a firm or industry. For example, firms that decide to buffer their workers' wages from the vagaries of the external labor market may face relatively higher production costs during recessions, which may leave them more vulnerable to foreign competition. Second, the OLS estimation may be subject to an omitted variable bias. For example, managers with weak incentives may tend to protect their workers more from outside labor-market conditions and also be more likely targeted by foreign competitors.
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These examples justify the need to identify a source of variation in import penetration that is independent of all management choice variables. I follow Revenga (1990 Revenga ( , 1992 and instrument industry measures of import penetration with source-weighted industry exchange rates. 20 The exchange rate variable is correlated with industry-level measures of import penetration but is primarily determined by macroeconomic variables that, conditional on year dummies, can reasonably be regarded as exogenous to the behavior of a certain industry in a certain period. 21 Thus, it is a valid instrument for import penetration. 18 The individual fixed effects, however, do not deal with the possibility that job-matching quality is procyclical. It is difficult, though, to explain why variations in import penetration would affect the procyclicality of job-matching quality. It is especially difficult to explain why current levels of import penetration would affect the quality of previously made matches.
19 Note that both of these stories imply a positive correlation between the level of import penetration and the use of implicit wage shielding contracts. These stories thus work against finding a negative impact of import penetration on wage shielding in an OLS specification.
20 See Sec. IV and app. B for a detailed description of how the exchange rate variables are constructed.
21 Controlling for year dummies is possible because the exchange-rate variable varies between industry based on the composition of imports by country of origin.
In summary, the empirical strategy consists in estimating equations (9) and (10) by two-stage least squares. In equation (9) 
IV. Data
This section briefly reviews the principal data sources used in this article. Appendix B contains a more detailed description of all the data sources.
I use two different individual-level labor data sets: a Current Population Survey (CPS) extract and a Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) extract. The CPS extract is the repeated cross-section data set. It is a random subset of the entire set of manufacturing workers in the May CPSs and Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (MORGs) of the CPS over the period 1976-92. I limit the sample to manufacturing workers since import penetration data are available for only the manufacturing sector of the economy. I use the May CPSs over the period 1976-81 and the MORGs over the period 1983-92. Both the use of the May CPSs over the period 1976-81 and the absence of data for 1982 are justified by the need to extract a control for union status. Union status is not available in 1982 and is available in the May CPSs only prior to 1982.
The PSID extract is the panel data set. As I have already alluded to in Section III, this second data set has two main advantages over the CPS extract. First, the PSID contains information about the length of tenure with the current employer. 23 This information is crucial to the construction of a measure of local labor-market conditions at the time of job start. Second, the PSID extract permits a superior control for compositional effects because of its panel structure. Unfortunately, the PSID also has major drawbacks. First, the sample size is limited. It is especially so in the case of this study as I have to concentrate on workers in the manufacturing sector. Second, the PSID does not contain a detailed industry 22 In practice, I often use both the current and lagged industry source-weighted exchange rates as instruments. 23 Note that the wording of this question has substantially changed over time. Before 1984, the question could have been interpreted as duration of continuous employment rather than time together with the present employer. After 1984, the question explicitly asks for time together with the present employer (Polsky 1999 Both the CPS and the PSID extracts are merged by industry and year with an import penetration variable and a real exchange rate index. The import penetration variable is constructed from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Trade Database. This database is described in detail in Feenstra (1996) . Import penetration is defined as the ratio of imports over imports plus domestic production in a given industry and a given year. The real exchange rate index also varies at the industry-year level. It is defined as the weighted geometric average of the real exchange rates of the importing countries. The weights for a given industry are the shares of each foreign country's imports in the total imports of that industry in a base period . I use a concordance between the 1972 standard industrial classification (SIC) code (in which the trade data are expressed) and the census of population industry classification code to link the import penetration and exchange rate variables to the individuallevel labor data sets.
The two labor data extracts are also merged by state and year with an unemployment rate measure. The unemployment rate measure is the log state unemployment rate for the total civilian population in a given year.
Finally, the two labor data extracts are merged by industry and year with a set of corporate variables constructed from COMPUSTAT, which reports historical financial data for more than 7,500 corporations established in the United States. The data are drawn from shareholders', 10-K, and 10-Q reports and generally consist of large companies with substantial public ownership. While manufacturing firms in COMPUSTAT represent only a limited proportion of the total number of manufacturing firms in the United States, they represent a very large proportion of total manufacturing employment. For example, in 1985, manufacturing employment in COMPUSTAT totals about 16 million. 24 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics's Employment and Earnings, 19 million workers were employed in manufacturing in the United States in 1985. The industry-level corporate variables I compute are weighted industry averages of the equivalent firm-level variables. Each firm is weighted in a given year by the share of its total assets in that year in the "total" assets of the industry. I use a concordance between the SIC-72 code (in which COMPUSTAT data are expressed) and the census of population industry classification code to merge the corporate variables with the CPS and PSID extracts. I compute industry-level measures for accounting return, stock market return, and leverage.
Once merged with the import penetration, exchange rate, and corporate variables, the CPS extract covers 62 different industries, while the PSID extract covers 65 different industries.
V. Empirical Results

A. Descriptive Statistics
Tables 1 and 2 present summary statistics for the main variables of interest in the CPS and PSID extracts, respectively. For each of these two extracts, I also consider two important subsamples. First, I consider the subsamples of male workers. Implicit agreements typically require some relatively long-term attachment to the labor force. Because males have more stable labor-force participation, one might suspect that they are more likely to be covered by the implicit wage-setting contracts. This implies that they are also more likely to be affected by changes in import competition. Finding larger changes in wage-unemployment elasticities for male workers would, in that sense, be a first check of the validity of the results.
Second, I consider the subsamples of nonunionized males. One might worry that the results in this article capture changes in explicit, rather than implicit, contracting. Previous work has indeed documented how changes in the competitive environment of an industry may lead to a breakdown of national union contracts in that industry. For example, Belzer (1995) studies how the economic deregulation of the trucking industry affected the nature of union bargaining. He finds that bargaining between the Teamsters and general freight motor carriers became more decentralized following deregulation. While wage levels in the trucking industry used to be very uniform across regions under national bargaining, deregulation increased the sensitivity of wages to local economic conditions. Hence, changes in explicit contracting could explain why product market competition increases the elasticity of wages to state unemployment rates. I will show that results are not driven by changes in the nature of union contracts.
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The CPS samples (table 1) appear to have a higher proportion of females and unionized workers than the PSID samples (table 2) . Also, mean import penetration is higher in the PSID. Lower unionization and higher imports in the PSID both reflect the fact that the PSID extract covers a more recent time period on average. Workers in the PSID samples are younger and, having education levels similar to the CPS workers, are less experienced.
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In both the PSID and the CPS extracts, the full sample and two subsamples differ in expected ways. Male workers earn higher wages, are somewhat more educated (especially if they are not unionized), and have a higher unionization rate. Nonunion males appear less experienced and slightly younger than the average male worker. Tenure with employer (only available in the PSID sample and reported in months) is higher for male workers, although it is about 4 months lower for nonunionized males than for the average worker in the full sample.
B. Basic Results
In this section, I present evidence that, other things equal, wages in an industry become more sensitive to the current unemployment rate and less sensitive to the unemployment rate at the time of job start when that industry faces an increase in import penetration. I will first discuss the CPS results. The CPS data set is much larger than the PSID data set and covers a longer time period. However, as I mentioned above, the CPS data set does not contain the work history information required to compute the time of job start. Hence, in the CPS data, I can only study changes in the current wage-current unemployment elasticity. In the second part of this section, I will remedy this weakness of the CPS by moving to the PSID data. Table 3 presents the effect of import penetration on the elasticity of wages to the current rate of unemployment. I consider two different measures of foreign competition. First, I simply measure competition with the contemporaneous level of import penetration. In light of the model presented in Section II, one might argue against the use of such a contemporaneous measure. A more relevant measure should instead capture firms' expectations about future levels of import penetration. Under the hypothesis that exchange rates follow a random walk (Meese and Rogoff 1983) , the current level of import penetration may, however, be the best proxy for firms' expectation about future level of import penetration, especially in the IV model. Nevertheless, I will also use as an alternative Source.-Data are composed of a random subsample of manufacturing workers over 1976-81 (source: May Current Population Survey) and 1983-92 (source: Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups, Current Population Survey).
CPS Results
Note.-Dependent variable: log( ) (log deflated hourly wage); IV p instrumental variables; OLS w ijkt p ordinary least squares. In cols. 1-3 and 7-9, measures current import penetration. In cols. 4-6 imp jt and 10-12, is the average of current, 1-year lead, and 2-year lead import penetration. Variables are imp jt defined in Sec. IV and app. B. The dependent variable is the log deflated hourly wage. Both import penetration and the log unemployment rate have been demeaned. Covariates included in each regression are 51 state dummies, 16 year dummies, and 62 industry dummies. Additional covariates included in each regression are education, a quartic in experience, a union dummy, a nonwhite dummy, a female dummy, and interactions for the four experience terms with the female dummy. In the IV specifications (cols. 1-6), both import penetration and the interaction of import penetration with the log unemployment rate are instrumented. The instruments are current and 1-year lagged exchange rate indices and the interaction of these indices with the log unemployment rate. Standard errors are in parentheses except that the numbers in parentheses below the -statistics are p-values. They are corrected to allow for group 2 x effects within state-industry-year cells.
measure the mean level of import penetration over a 3-year period: current period, 1-year, and 2-year leads.
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The structure of table 3 is as follows: columns 1-6 present the IV regressions. Columns 1-3 use current import penetration as the measure of foreign competition, while columns 4-6 use the 3-year average import penetration. Columns 1 and 4 use the full sample, columns 2 and 5 concentrate on male workers, and columns 3 and 6 on nonunionized males.
Columns 7-12 are the equivalent OLS specifications. The dependent variable in each column is the log of deflated hourly wage. Each regression includes 16 year dummies, 51 state dummies, 62 industry fixed effects, and a set of demographic controls. The demographic controls are education, a quartic in experience, a union dummy, a nonwhite dummy, a female dummy, and interactions for the four experience terms with the female dummy. In each IV regression, two variables are instrumented: the import penetration measure and the interaction of import penetration with the current state log unemployment rate. The instruments are current and 1-year lagged industry exchange rate indices as well as the interaction of each of these indices with the current state log unemployment rate. Standard errors are adjusted for group effects. For illustration, table C1 reports the two first-stage equations associated with regression 4 in table 3. The instruments are jointly very highly significant for each of the first-stage regressions (
). p ! .001 I start by discussing the IV results.
28 First, consistent with previous work, I find that a higher level of import penetration reduces the level of wages in the IV specifications.
29 More important, the results in table 3 show that import competition increases the elasticity of wages to the current unemployment rate. The change in elasticity is stronger for the subset of male workers, and stronger yet for nonunionized males.
30 However, none of these differences is statistically significant. Note that the partial test of whether the instrumental variables are correlated with the error term (not reported here) fails to reject the null hypothesis of no correlation at the .10 level in all cases.
Consider table 3, column 1. At the mean level of import penetration 28 Because of space constraints, I do not report the coefficients on the demographic variables for all the regressions in table 3. Table D1 presents the full list of estimated coefficients for table 3, regression 4. Wages are significantly higher for whites, males, unionized, more educated, and more experienced workers. The returns to experience are lower for females. 29 Several authors have already studied the impact of trade pressures on the level of wages. In a panel of manufacturing industries over the period 1977-87, Revenga (1992) shows that changes in import prices significantly reduce wages. Using industry-state-year data, Goldberg and Tracy (2001) find that import and export exchange rate movements have statistically significant effects on wages. They also find that the importance of these effects varies across industries and regions. Interestingly, Campa and Goldberg (2001) find that the exchange rate effects on wages are stronger in lower profit margin industries. 30 In regressions not reported here, I have also split the sample based on whether the individual has at best completed high school or has at least completed 1 year of education after high school. I find that the change in elasticity is stronger in the high education group. This is consistent with the idea that educated workers are more likely to be covered by implicit employment contracts. This fact also matches the popular perception that the conditions of employment are especially changing for the white-collar workforce.
(about 10%), a one-standard-deviation increase in the unemployment rate reduces wages by about 1%. If import penetration increases by 10 percentage points (a little more than one standard deviation), wages drop by about 1.6% for the same increase in the unemployment rate. In column 3, a one-standard-deviation increase in the unemployment rate reduces nonunionized male workers' wages by 2.5% instead of 1.5% when import penetration is 10 percentage points higher.
A comparison of columns 1-6 and 7-12 confirms the importance of the instrumentation strategy. First, like Revenga (1990 Revenga ( , 1992 , I find no significant impact of trade on wage levels in the OLS specifications. Second, there is no apparent effect of foreign competition on the sensitivity of wages to the local unemployment rate in the OLS model. As I mentioned before, a potential explanation of the discrepancy between the OLS and IV results is that industries that protect their workers are likely to engage at the same time in other personnel practices (such as paying above market wages) that reduce their competitiveness and weaken their protection from foreign producers. In all the specifications of table 3, I have restricted the returns to all the demographic variables to be constant over the entire sample period. These restrictions are not realistic. For example, it is well known that the returns to education have increased over the period under study. Table 4 verifies the robustness of the results to these specification assumptions. I present only the IV results. In columns 1-5, I allow the returns to education, unionization, race, experience, and sex, respectively, to vary over time. The coefficient on is never affected. The statistical significance of the estimate is, however, weakened in these last two cases ( ). p p .11 Sec. IV and app. B. The dependent variable is the log deflated hourly wage. Both import penetration and the log unemployment rate have been demeaned. Covariates included in each regression are 51 state dummies, 16 year dummies, and 62 industry dummies. Additional covariates included in each regression are education, a quartic in experience, a union dummy, a nonwhite dummy, a female dummy, and interactions for the four experience terms with the female dummy. In each specification, both import penetration and the interaction of import penetration with the log unemployment rate are instrumented. The instruments are current and 1-year lagged exchange rate indices and the interaction of these indices with the log unemployment rate. Standard errors are in parentheses. They are corrected to allow for group effects within state-industry-year cells.
The findings so far suggest that, everything else equal, the flexibility of wages over the business cycle increases when industries face higher competitive pressures from imports. While this fact is consistent with a switch from contractual wage setting to spot-market wage setting, it is also in accord with alternative models of wage determination. For example, in an adverse selection theory of wage rigidity, firms do not lower wages during recessions because they fear that the most qualified workers will quit first. One effect of stronger foreign competition may be to force domestic firms to produce lower quality goods that do not require such a qualified labor force. Because of the now lower cost of turnover, wages become more flexible. 33 The PSID results I discuss next provide additional evidence for the implicit contract story that is harder to reconcile with such alternative explanations. 33 An alternative and equally plausible story is that stronger foreign competition actually leads firms to produce higher quality products in order to differentiate themselves from foreign competitors. In that case, the value of having a stable and qualified workforce may have increased, not decreased. Table 5 has the same structure as table 3. Columns 1-6 present the IV regressions. Columns 1-3 use current import penetration as the measure of foreign competition, and columns 4-6 use the 3-year average future import penetration. Columns 1 and 4 use the full sample, columns 2 and 5 concentrate on male workers, and columns 3 and 6 concentrate on nonunionized males. Columns 7-12 are the equivalent OLS specifications. The dependent variable in each column is the log of the deflated hourly wage.
PSID Results
Recall that regressions reported in table 5 differ from the CPS regressions in two main respects. First, because of the panel structure of the PSID, I have included individual fixed effects in each of the regressions in table 5 in addition to the state, year, and industry fixed effects. By looking within individuals, I control for possible compositional effects. In the CPS regressions, I partially address this issue by looking within demographic groups. The PSID allows me to go further because I can also take into account unobserved individual characteristics that are fixed over time.
Second, and most important, because of the work history information available in the PSID, I can study not only how import penetration affects the sensitivity of current wages to the current labor-market conditions but also how import penetration affects the sensitivity of current wages to the labor-market conditions at the time of tenure start. As I stressed earlier, an important characteristic of the shielding agreements described in Section II is that the fixed wages paid to workers by a firm are negotiated upon entry in the firm and depend on the labor-market conditions at that time. Hence, while workers are shielded from current conditions, the fixed wage they are paid in every period is higher if entry occurred during an expansion and lower if entry occurred when there was a lot of slack in the labor market. My model predicts that, as product market competition increases, current wages become less correlated to the starting unemployment rate and more correlated to the current unemployment rate. The PSID allows me to test both of these predictions.
In each IV regression in table 5, three variables are being instrumented: the import penetration measure, the interaction of import penetration with the current state unemployment rate, and the interaction of import penetration with the state unemployment rate at the time of job start. The instruments are the current industry exchange rate index and the interaction of this index with the current state unemployment rate and state unemployment rate at the time of job start. The first-stage equations, not reported here, show that the instruments are jointly very highly significant in all cases ( ). p ! .001 Before discussing directly the coefficients on the two interaction terms Note.-Dependent variable: log( ) (log deflated hourly wage); IV p instrumental variables; OLS w ijkt p ordinary least squares. In cols. 1-3 and 7-9, measures current import penetration. In cols. 4-6 imp jt and 10-12, is the average of current, 1-year lead, and 2-year lead import penetration. Variables are imp jt defined in Sec. IV and app. B. The dependent variable is the log deflated hourly wage. Import penetration, the log current unemployment, and the log unemployment rate at tenure start have been demeaned. Covariates included in each regression are 51 state dummies, 12 year dummies, and 65 industry dummies for the full sample; 59 for the sample of males; and 57 for the sample of nonunion males. Additional covariates included in each regression are age, tenure with present employer, a union dummy, a quartic in experience, and interactions for the four experience terms with a female dummy. In each IV specification (cols. 1-6), import penetration and the interactions of import penetration with the current log unemployment rate and the log unemployment rate at tenure start are instrumented. The instruments are the current exchange rate index and the interactions of this index with the current log unemployment rate and the log unemployment rate at tenure start. Standard errors are in parentheses. They are corrected to allow for group effects within state-industry-year cells.
and
, let me briefly comment on some of the other
covariates. 34 First, like Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) , I find that the negative dependence between wages and current unemployment rate is seriously weakened when I control for the unemployment rate at the time of tenure start. Actually, the point estimate on appears positive, alu kt though not significant, in most specifications. There is a strong negative correlation between wages and unemployment rate at tenure start: a onestandard-deviation increase in the starting unemployment rate reduces current wages by 1.6%-2.1%. 35 Second, the effect of import penetration on wages is significant neither in the IV regressions nor in the OLS regressions. However, the point estimates in the IV regressions are negative, indicating a .5% decrease in wages for every one percentage point increase in import penetration.
The results in table 5 are consistent with the predictions of the model. First, the effect of import penetration on the elasticity of wages to current unemployment rate is qualitatively similar to the effect found in the CPS extract. Higher import penetration increases the sensitivity of wages to current labor-market conditions. In the IV regressions, the point estimates on the interaction term are somewhat larger than in 36 Consider column 1. At the mean level of import penetration, a one-standard-deviation decrease in the unemployment rate at the time of job start increases wages by 1.8%. When import penetration 34 Demographic controls included in each regression are a quartic in experience, a union dummy, age, tenure with present employer, and interactions for the four experience terms with a female dummy. As in the CPS regressions, the coefficients on the demographic controls (not reported) are consistent with expectations. Wages increase with experience and tenure and are higher for unionized workers. The returns to experience are lower for females.
35 Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) also investigate the importance of the minimum unemployment rate since the job start. They find that the minimum unemployment rate is a better predictor of current wages than both the current and starting unemployment rates. They interpret this finding as evidence for a model of implicit contracting where workers have small-to-no mobility costs. For completeness, I have reestimated eq. (10), replacing the starting unemployment rate with the minimum unemployment rate. The coefficient on was unaffected. The imp # u jt kt coefficient on interacted with the minimum unemployment rate was positive imp jt but statistically insignificant. 36 The results are less precise when I focus on the small subset of nonunion male workers. is 10 percentage points higher, the same reduction in the starting unemployment rate increases the cohort's wages by only .6%. Interestingly, the OLS and IV regressions deliver similar coefficients on .
imp # us jt ikt
In summary, the PSID results suggest that import penetration reduces the shielding of wages from current labor-market conditions and reduces wage cohort effects. This is consistent with the idea that higher competitive pressures in the product market weaken the use of implicit wage contracts and turn wage setting into more of a spot-market transaction. The PSID results are harder to reconcile with alternative models such as those proposed at the end of Section V.B.1. Indeed, those alternative models do not predict any relationship between wages and the unemployment rate at the time of job start. In standard efficiency wage models, for example, wages are set to maximize firms' profits in every period under some effort constraint (no-shirking condition) or quality constraint (worker quality is increasing in the wage). There is no obvious theoretical reason for efficiency wages to be linked to the starting unemployment rate.
In Sections V.C and V.D, I test whether the financial channels discussed in Section II can in part help explain the transformation of the wagesetting process. More specifically, I link the labor-market changes to corporate variables such as performance and leverage. I ask whether a decline in corporate performance induced by exchange rate movements fosters wage flexibility. I also ask whether the link between import penetration and the wage-unemployment elasticities is stronger in more-leveraged industries.
C. The Role of Corporate Returns
In table 6, I estimate an equation similar to equation (9). However, I replace with measures of industry corporate returns instrumented imp jt by exchange rate fluctuations.
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Columns 1-3 of table 6 present the IV results, while columns 4-6 present the OLS results. Each regression includes the same set of control variables as for table 3. In columns 1 and 4, corporate returns are measured 37 As I did the CPS regressions, I ran specifications where the returns to the main demographic variables (age, experience, sex, and union status) were allowed to vary over time. The results were unaffected. 38 The existing empirical literature on rent sharing typically uses profit-per-head as a measure of corporate profitability (Abowd and Lemieux 1993; Blanchflower, Oswald, and Sanfrey 1996) . Profit-per-head indeed proxies well for employers' ability to pay their workers. In this subsection, I use measures of corporate performance that are not normalized by the number of workers in the industry. Indeed, I am not as much interested in capturing firms' ability to pay wages as in proxying for firms' total profit or firms' profit relative to their financial obligations. Note.-Dependent variable: log( ) (log deflated hourly wage); IV p instrumental variables; OLS p ordinary least squares. Sample size is 130,567. In cols. 1 and w ijkt 4, measures the current operating income to total assets ratio for industry j. In cols. 2 and 5, is the average of current, 1-year lead, and 2-year lead operating ret ret jt jt income to total assets ratios. In cols. 3 and 6, measures current stock market return. Variables are defined in Sec. IV and app. B. The dependent variable is the log ret jt deflated hourly wage. Both corporate return and the log unemployment rate have been demeaned. Covariates included in each regression are 51 state dummies, 16 year dummies, and 62 industry dummies. Additional covariates included in each regression are education, a quartic in experience, a union dummy, a nonwhite dummy, a female dummy, and interactions for the four experience terms with the female dummy. In the IV specifications (cols. 1-3), both corporate return and the interaction of corporate return with the log unemployment rate are instrumented. The instruments are current and 1-year lagged exchange rate indices and the interaction of these indices with the log unemployment rate. Standard errors are in parentheses. They are corrected to allow for group effects within state-industry-year cells.
by current industry average operating income (COMPUSTAT data item 178) to total assets (COMPUSTAT data item 6) ratio. In columns 2 and 5, I consider the 3-year average of current, 1-year, and 2-year lead operating income to total assets ratios in order to concentrate on more permanent movements in a firm's financial performance. In columns 3 and 6, I use industry average stock market return.
The instrumental variable strategy should by now be clear. Both corporate returns and the interaction of corporate returns with the log unemployment rate are instrumented. The instruments are the current and 1-year lagged exchange rate indices as well as the interaction of each of these indices with the state log unemployment rate. Assuming that the exchange rate indices are valid instruments for import penetration, they will also be valid instruments for corporate returns if import penetration affects wage-setting rules only through its impact on corporate returns. Otherwise, the instrumental variables will not be orthogonal to the error term, and equations 1-3 in table 6 will not be properly specified. A test (not reported here) of whether the instrumental variables in equations 1-3 in table 6 are correlated with the error term fails to reject the null hypothesis of no correlation. Table E1 presents the first-stage equations associated with column 3 of table 6. The instruments are all jointly very significant for each first-stage regression ( ).
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p ! .001 In all of the IV regressions, I find that lower corporate return leads to a higher sensitivity of wages to the current local labor-market unemployment rate. However, the effect of stock market return on the wageunemployment elasticity (col. 3) is noisily estimated ( ). The ecop p .12 nomic magnitude of the effect is significant. Consider, for example, table 6, column 1. At the mean level of import penetration, a one-standarddeviation increase in the unemployment rate decreases wages by 1%. When the ratio of operating income over assets is one percentage point lower, the same one-standard-deviation increase in the unemployment rate decreases wages by 1.7%. In the OLS regressions, I find no economically or statistically significant effect of corporate returns on the wage-unemployment elasticity.
D. The Role of Leverage
In order to test more directly whether the risk of financial distress affects the nature of the wage-setting process, I study the differential impact of an exogenous change in import competition in high-versus low-leverage industries, where leverage is measured in a base year. 40 Intuitively, a given shock to import competition should a have a stronger impact on default risk for industries that start in an already weak financial position. 41 Consequently, if liquidity constraints mediate the changes in the wage-setting process, I should find a relatively stronger impact of import penetration on the wage-unemployment elasticities among the industries that are more leveraged at the beginning of the period under study. Tables 7 and 8 present the results of this exercise. In these tables, I estimate equations (9) and (10) separately for high-and low-leverage industries. I compute two different measures of financial leverage.
42 Table  7 uses a debt-to-equity ratio, while table 8 uses a "net leverage" measure. The first measure is simply the ratio of total debt (COMPUSTAT data item 181) to total equity (COMPUSTAT data item 216). The second measure is a net measure that takes into account cash reserves (COM-PUSTAT data item 1). It is defined as the ratio of total debt minus cash reserves to total debt minus cash reserves plus total equity. For each leverage measure, I compute the median industry leverage in a base year (1976 for the CPS extract and 1981 for the PSID extract). I then split the full CPS and PSID extracts into two subgroups: individuals who work in industries with below median financial leverage in the base year and individuals who work in industries with above median financial leverage in the base year.
In both tables 7 and 8, columns 1-4 show results from the CPS data, while columns 5-8 show results from the PSID data. Columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 display the IV regressions, while the other columns show the OLS 40 I have also studied whether the size of the coefficient on differs ret # u jt kt between high-and low-leverage industries. I find (in regressions not reported here) that, for a given decrease in accounting returns, industries with low leverage display a relatively weaker increase in the wage-unemployment elasticity than more constrained ones. This fact is consistent with the results in tables 7 and 8. However, I find no significant difference between the two leverage groups when I compare their wage-setting reaction to a given change in stock market returns. 41 While intuitively appealing, the idea that more levered firms are more likely to fail when competition gets tougher on the product market is theoretically ambiguous. Indeed, one could envision a model where debt forces firms to react faster to changes in the competitive environment (Jensen 1989) . However, the results of a growing empirical literature on the link between capital structure and product market competition tend to validate the more intuitive model. Chevalier (1995) studies the supermarket industry. She finds that rivals of chains that undertook a leverage buyout were relatively more likely to expand in their local market. Zingales (1998) shows that highly levered trucking firms were less likely to survive the newly competitive environment that followed the deregulation of the motor carrier industry.
42 See app. B for more details. Note.-Dependent variable: log( ) (log deflated hourly wage); IV p instrumental variables; OLS p ordinary least squares. Variables are defined in Sec. IV and app. B. w ijkt The dependent variable is the log deflated hourly wage. Both import penetration and the log unemployment rate have been demeaned. High-leverage industries are industries that have a debt-to-equity ratio above median in a base year (1976 for the CPS sample and 1981 for the PSID sample). Covariates included in each regression are 51 state dummies and 16 year dummies. Columns 1-4 have 31 industry fixed effects, cols. 5 and 7 have 33 industry fixed effects, and cols. 6 and 8 have 32 industry fixed effects. Additional covariates included in regressions 1-4 are education, a quartic in experience, a union dummy, a nonwhite dummy, a female dummy, and interactions for the four experience terms with the female dummy; additional covariates in cols. 5-8 are age, tenure with present employer, a union dummy, a quartic in experience, and interactions for the four experience terms with a female dummy. In cols. 1 and 2, both import penetration and the interaction of import penetration with the log unemployment rate are instrumented. The instruments are current and 1-year lagged exchange rate indices and the interaction of these indices with the log unemployment rate. In cols. 5 and 6, import penetration and the interactions of import penetration with both the current log unemployment rate and the log unemployment rate at tenure start are instrumented. The instruments are the current exchange rate index and the interactions of this index with the current log unemployment rate and the log unemployment rate at tenure start. Standard errors are in parentheses. They are corrected to allow for group effects within state-industry-year cells. Note.-Dependent variable: log( ) (log deflated hourly wage); IV p instrumental variables; OLS p ordinary least squares. Variables are defined in Sec. IV and app. B. w ijkt The dependent variable is the log deflated hourly wage. Both import penetration and the log unemployment rate have been demeaned. "High-leverage industries" are industries that have a net leverage above median in a base year (1976 for the CPS sample and 1981 for the PSID sample). Covariates included in each regression are 51 state dummies and 16 year dummies. Columns 1-4 have 31 industry fixed effects, cols. 5 and 7 have 33 industry fixed effects, and cols. 6 and 8 have 32 industry fixed effects. Additional covariates included in regressions 1-4 are education, a quartic in experience, a union dummy, a nonwhite dummy, a female dummy, and interactions for the four experience terms with the female dummy; additional covariates in cols. 5-8 are age, tenure with present employer, a union dummy, a quartic in experience, and interactions for the four experience terms with a female dummy. In cols. 1 and 2, both import penetration and the interaction of import penetration with the log unemployment rate are instrumented. The instruments are current and 1-year lagged exchange rate indices and the interaction of these indices with the log unemployment rate. In cols. 5 and 6, import penetration and the interactions of import penetration with both the current log unemployment rate and the log unemployment rate at tenure start are instrumented. The instruments are the current exchange rate index and the interactions of this index with the current log unemployment rate and the log unemployment rate at tenure start. Standard errors are in parentheses. They are corrected to allow for group effects within state-industry-year cells.
results. Odd columns focus on the high-leverage industries, and even columns on the low-leverage industries.
I first discuss table 7. I concentrate on the IV regressions. In both the CPS and the PSID data, import penetration increases the current wage-current unemployment elasticity for the high-leverage industries but does not significantly affect this elasticity for the low-leverage industries. Moreover, the point estimates on the interaction term imp # jt are about two-thirds smaller in absolute value for the low-leverage u kt industries. Similarly, the reduction in wage cohort effects is large and significant in high-leverage industries and not statistically significant in low-leverage industries. Because standard errors are large, I cannot reject that the high-and low-leverage coefficients are identical at a reasonable level of significance.
Interestingly, the results in table 7 also reveal that the impact of import competition on wage levels is very different for the two types of industries. 43 Only the highly leveraged industries seem to experience a drop in wage following an increase in import penetration. This is especially striking in the CPS regressions (col. 1 vs. col. 2). The comparison of coefficients on in columns 5 and 6 suggest a similar finding for the PSID. The imp jt estimation is, however, less precise in this case. Table 8 duplicates the message of table 7. The main difference is in the PSID regressions, where it is now difficult to find any difference between high-and low-leverage industries for the coefficient on . Howimp # u jt kt ever, the difference between high-and low-leverage groups with respect to the starting unemployment rate is more striking in table 8 than it is  in table 7 . My findings in this subsection are closest in spirit to those of Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) , who study the link between capital market imperfections and the countercyclicality of markups. They argue that liquidity constraints prevent firms from choosing prices that maximize the discounted value of profits. They consider a product market where consumers have "switching costs." In such a market, firms may want to keep prices low in the short run in order to build market shares. During economic downturns, financially constrained firms face strictly positive default probabilities. They are then relatively less willing to invest in building market shares because they may not be able to reap the full benefits of their investment. Chevalier and Scharfstein provide empirical support for their theory. They show that, during recessions, highly liquidity-constrained 43 There is limited empirical work on the link between capital structure and wages. Moreover, the existing work is subject to serious identification problems. Nickell and Wadhwani (1989) use a panel of U.K. manufacturing firms and find a negative correlation between wages and debt-to-equity ratio. Hanka (1998) use a sample of COMPUSTAT firms. He also finds a negative correlation between wages and various measures of debt. supermarkets raise their price relative to less-constrained supermarkets. In a similar fashion, I show that when import penetration is high, moreleveraged industries shield their workers relatively less from the external labor market than less-leveraged industries do. One interpretation for this finding is that, akin to Chevalier and Scharfstein's model, financially constrained industries are less willing to invest in building long-term relationships with their workers when import penetration is high because they may never be able to reap the future benefits of a good reputation.
E. Alternative Mechanisms
The results in Sections V.C and V.D are consistent with the mechanisms outlined in Section II. Two other mechanisms seem able to explain, under some additional assumptions, the links among capital structure, corporate performance, and the use of shielding agreements in the employment relationship. Shleifer and Summers (1988) develop a model where workers make firm-specific human capital investments and managers sign implicit contracts to compensate workers for their investments. Clearly, the firmspecific investments lead to a classic time-consistency problem. Shleifer and Summers argue that incumbent managers are more inclined to honor the implicit contracts than owners are. The managers have a "preference" for not breaching the trust of their workers. In the context of their model, one could reinterpret the findings of Sections V.C and V.D in the following way: greater product market competition reduces the room for discretion in managerial decision. Consequently, managers become more likely to maximize short-term profits and less likely to honor the implicit agreements. There are two implicit assumptions in this reasoning. First, product market competition must be negatively correlated with managerial discretion. However, the sign of this correlation is an unsettled theoretical and empirical issue. 44 Second, a given shock to competition must have a stronger impact on the level of managerial discretion in the more liquidityconstrained industries. Again, whether this assumption holds will depend on the particular model of managerial discretion one adopts.
The behavioral economics literature also supports models of wage setting where workers are shielded from outside labor-market conditions. Authors in the behavioral field have argued that managers do not cut wages in periods of high unemployment for fairness reasons. Kahneman et al. (1986) develop a framework to help think through the determinants of fairness judgments. A central concept in their framework is a principle of "dual entitlement" in a "reference transaction." Applied to the labor market, this principle means that, in the wage-setting process, workers have a reference wage and firms have a reference profit. Those two references characterize the terms of the transaction. Firms are not allowed to raise profits by violating the entitlement of workers to their reference wage. Only if the reference profit is threatened can the firm set new terms for the transaction and reduce wages below the reference point. An implication of this principle is that, under "fair" wage setting, wages will not be sensitive to an excess supply of labor as long as the firm's profitability is sufficiently high. However, when rents go down below the reference level, workers agree to let wages become more flexible. The fairness model of Kahneman et al. (1986) , however, does not account for a principal finding of this article: it makes no direct prediction about the sensitivity of wages to the unemployment rate at the time of job start.
VI. Summary and Conclusion
As Baker and Holmstrom (1995) note, there currently exist too many theories and too few facts about internal labor markets. And indeed, empirical regularities are difficult to generate in the absence of data sets containing personnel information for a panel of representative firms. This study has demonstrated that some insights can nevertheless be gained about the functioning of internal labor markets, and more precisely the wage-setting process within these markets, even without such ideal data sets.
Specifically, I have shown that exogenous shocks to foreign competition modify cohort effects in wages. Such shocks change the sensitivity of current wages to the current unemployment rate as well as the sensitivity of wages to the unemployment rate prevailing at the time that the worker was hired. I have also shown that these changes are stronger among more financially constrained industries than among less-constrained ones. These findings are consistent with the idea that the financial pressures caused by tougher competition alter the preference for sheltering workers' wages. Lower profits and the ensuing higher default probability may decrease employers' ex post cost of reneging on previous commitments to their workers and may reduce the set of time-consistent wage-setting institutions.
Because it concentrates on the impact of foreign competition, this article is also of direct interest to the policy makers that have asked how the globalization of the U.S. economy has affected its labor market. A vast research effort has already been devoted to establishing the link between the broader opening to trade and the rise in income inequality. The partial equilibrium results in this article suggest that more attention should devoted in the future to studying the overall effect of globalization not only on simple shifts in the demand for labor but also on the nature of the employment contract.
Appendix A Simultaneous Equations Issues
My empirical strategy is basically equivalent to estimating a differencesin-differences regression. Consider, for example, equation (9) Then estimating equation (9) is equivalent to estimating the two following equations:
The coefficient c on the interaction term in equation (9) is u # imp kt jt given by the difference between and :
Each of these two equations above is subject to a standard identification problem. Indeed, each of these equations is a reduced-form equation derived from a system of two equations: a labor demand curve and a labor supply or wage-setting curve. Simplifying notations, the system of equations associated with each of the two equations is given by 
I am ultimately interested in estimating the slope of the wage-setting curve, , under different levels of product market competition (H and a q L). What happens if one estimates equations (11) and (12) ignoring the simultaneous equations issue? One can easily show that will be given a q by
What are sufficient conditions under which (the exactâ
difference in the slope of the wage-setting curve between high and low competition is estimated) or, at least,
qualitative difference in the slope of the wage-setting curve between high and low competition is correctly estimated)?
Consider first the case where, for every level of product market competition, all the variation in unemployment rate is driven by demand shocks:
. In that case, the exact quantitative change in the j p j p 0
SS SS H L
slope of the wage-setting curve is estimated. Note that, in the estimation of a standard wage curve (e.g., Blanchflower and Oswald 1994; Card 1995; Blanchard and Katz 1997) , the identifying assumption is in fact also that . Hence, this first case delivers an unbiased estimate of the effect j p 0 SS of product market competition on the slope of the wage-setting curve and does not rely on more restrictive assumptions than the ones required for the proper estimation of a standard wage curve.
If the standard wage curve is not correctly identified ( ), my esj 1 0 SS timation strategy will still deliver a correct assessment of the qualitative change in the slope of the wage curve if the variance of both supply and demand shocks is unchanged with product market competition and the slope of the labor demand curve is also unchanged with product market competition:
, , and . The most ques-
tionable equality in this second set of identification assumptions is probably the third one. Most of the economic literature on the effect of trade on labor markets has typically modeled an increase in trade openness with a shift down in the domestic labor demand curve (see Katz and Murphy 1992; Borjas and Ramey 1995) . Under these models, the restrictions implied by the three equalities above are quite reasonable, and one can assume that the qualitative change in the slope of the wage-setting curve is correctly estimated. However, some authors have recently suggested that one of the main effects of globalization might have been to flatten the domestic labor demand curve by increasing the degree of substitutability between goods (Leamer 1998) . There is as yet little empirical evidence in support of this theory. Using industry-level data, Slaughter (2001) finds no evidence of a link between labor demand elasticities and trade-exposure measures.
Appendix B
Individual-Level Data
CPS Extract
The CPS extract covers all the manufacturing workers in the May CPSs from 1976 to 1981 and a random subset of all the manufacturing workers in the MORGs of the CPS over the period 1983-92. I randomly draw 30% of the entire set within an industry-state-year cell, thereby maintaining the proportion of each industry-state-year cell. The extract does not cover years prior to 1976 because it is matched to a COMPUSTAT extract, which starts in 1976. The wage data are the log deflated hourly wage, where wage is defined as usual weekly earnings over usual number of hours of work per week. Wages are deflated using the Consumer Price Index (CPI;
). I exclude any observation for which the 1982-84 p 100 deflated hourly wage is less than one or more than 100 and impute earnings for the top-coded weekly earnings prior to 1989, following Katz and Murphy (1992) . For 1992, the education variable is made consistent with the prior definition. I impute years of work experience as age minus years of education minus six. If the imputation comes out negative, experience is reset to zero.
PSID Data Set
The PSID sample is drawn from the PSID's 1992 cross-year family and individual files. Because of the unavailability of a detailed industry code before 1981, the data set covers the period 1981-92. I extract information for male heads as well as for their female wives. The wage measure is the deflated hourly wage for hourly paid workers and the deflated salary (defined in hourly terms) for salaried workers. I do not use the information collected on the preceding calendar year annual labor income and hours of work, as those are subject to serious recall biases. I exclude any observation for which the deflated hourly wage is less than one and more than 100.
In order to compute the unemployment rate at the time of job start, I first consider the length of tenure with the present employer. I follow Brown and Light (1992) and define the start of a job as a year where the reporting tenure with the current employer is less than the elapsed time since the last interview. I assume that employment with the present employer started in the same state as it takes place now. Because I use statelevel unemployment rate and state-level unemployment rates are only available since 1970, the data set excludes jobs that started prior to 1970.
Trade Variables
Each of the individual-level data sets is merged by industry and year with the import penetration and real exchange rate index variables and by state and year with the log unemployment rate. The import penetration variable is computed at the industry level and is constructed from the NBER Trade Database (Feenstra 1996) . It is defined as the ratio of imports over imports plus domestic production in each year. Imports are c.i.f. (cost, insurance, freight) valued. The real exchange rate index is computed at the industry level. It is defined as the weighted average of the log real exchange rates of importing countries. The weights are the share of each foreign country's import in total imports in a base period . Real exchange rates are nominal exchange rates (expressed in foreign currency per dollar) multiplied by the U.S. CPI and divided by the foreign country CPI. Nominal exchange rates and foreign CPI's are from the International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund. I use a concordance between the SIC-72 code (in which the trade data are expressed) and the census of population industry classification code to link the import penetration and exchange rate variables to the wage variables.
Unemployment Variable
The log unemployment rate is defined at the state level. From 1978 to 1993, it is taken from Local Area Unemployment Statistics of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Prior to 1978, the state unemployment rates were provided by Lawrence Katz (Blanchard and Katz 1992) . The unemployment rate is the unemployment rate for the civilian noninstitutional labor force.
Corporate Variables: COMPUSTAT For most of the analysis, the CPS data are matched to a panel of industry-level corporate variables. The corporate variables are computed from COMPUSTAT, which reports financial statement variables for more than 7,500 corporations established in the United States since 1976. The data are drawn from shareholders', 10-K, and 10-Q reports and consists of large companies with substantial public ownership. The industry corporate variables are weighted industry averages of the firm-level variables. Each firm's weight in a given year is defined as the firm's total assets to total industry assets in that year. I use a concordance between the SIC-72 code and the census of population industry classification code to merge the financial variables with the CPS labor data. From COMPUSTAT, I compute corporate and stock market return measures as well as leverage measures. Stock market return is defined as the logarithm of shareholder wealth minus the logarithm of shareholder wealth in the previous year, which equals the rate of return received by the firm's shareholders, including price appreciation and dividends. As a measure of accounting return, I use the ratio of operating income after depreciation over total assets. I construct two different leverage measures: (1) total debt to total equity and (2) net leverage, which is the ratio of total debt minus cash and other short-term investments to total debt minus cash and other shortterm investments plus total equity. Note.-Dependent variable: log( ) (log deflated hourly wage). Variables w ijkt are defined in Sec. IV and app. B. The dependent variable is the log deflated hourly wage. The variable measures current import penetration. Both imp jt import penetration and the log unemployment rate have been demeaned. Other covariates included in each regression are 51 state dummies, 16 year dummies, and 62 industry dummies. Standard errors are in parentheses. They are corrected to allow for group effects within state-industry-year cells. 
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